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The corporation is a society which accomplishes its work through division of labor | a
proposition now so much taken for granted that it is surprising to think it once represented a
discovery.
Schon (1967) cited in Braverman (1974, p. 267)
1. Introduction
In this paper, we develop a theory of the rm where workers can specialize within a division
of labor. We are concerned with the following questions. How do incentives, employment,
and the division of labor dier across institutions? What is the relationship between
incentives and specialization? In particular, are they complements or substitutes? What
is the role of Holmstr om's budget-breaker when team size is endogenous?1 To answer these
questions, we extend the classical teams framework in Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and
Holmstr om (1982) using the theory of specialization and the division of labor in Becker
and Murphy (1992). We show that the extended model generates predictions at odds with
the classical literature but consistent with several institutional stylized facts and recent
organizational trends.
We start with the rst best benchmark, where a social planner chooses team size, task
assignments (i.e., the division of labor), and eorts to maximize the expected total surplus.
As in Becker and Murphy, an increase in team size results in greater specialization and
division of labor, which raises both the marginal product of eort and expected output per
worker. The rst best employment level therefore balances the tradeo between increasing
returns to specialization and the transaction costs associated with larger teams.
We consider two institutions under moral hazard: the partnership and the rm with
a budget-breaker. In Alchian and Demsetz, partnerships oer weak incentives and are
therefore necessarily small to limit shirking.2 As in Levin and Tadelis (2005), we focus on
equal-division partnerships (EDP) where revenue, tasks, and transaction costs are evenly
1 The literature on endogenous team size includes Levin and Tadelis (2005) and Liang et al. (2008).
These papers do not consider the relationship between incentives and employment or the role of the
budget-breaker when team size is endogenous but instead focus on other issues.
2 The literature on ecient or relatively ecient partnerships includes Rasmusen (1987), Legros and
Matsushima (1991), Legros and Matthews (1993), Garicano and Santos (2004), and Levin and Tadelis
(2005).
1divided among partners.3 An EDP chooses the number n of partners to maximize the
expected payo of the representative partner. The relevant tradeo diers from the rst
best in two respects. First, the representative partner only receives 1=n of the expected
surplus from the marginal hire. This 1=n problem is also an important aspect of the Levin
and Tadelis model and tends to make the EDP smaller than rst best. But unlike their
model, which focuses on worker selection issues rather than moral hazard, an increase in
employment also reduces the representative partner's exposure to risk. It follows that an
EDP can be larger or smaller than rst best depending on the relative magnitudes of these
two eects. Since the level of employment determines the degree of specialization and
the marginal product of eort, optimal EDP eort exceeds the rst best when an EDP is
ineciently large. In contrast with Alchian and Demsetz and Holmstr om, an EDP is not
necessarily small nor is it necessarily characterized by weak incentives and shirking relative
to the rst best.
As documented by Garicano and Hubbard (2009), the average law rm in the United
States is indeed quite small (3.65 lawyers) but the size distribution is highly skewed to the
right, with the largest having hundreds of partners excluding associates and other lawyers.
These relatively large law rms have evidently found some mechanism to address the free-
rider problem highlighted in the classical literature. In our model, we show that optimal
EDP size is increasing in the price of output and the level of risk, which is consistent with
a large number of small law rms handling low-risk, low-fee cases and a small number of
large law rms handling cases with the opposite characteristics.
We then turn to the rm, where the budget-breaker chooses incentives, employment,
and task assignments to maximize expected prots. Unlike an EDP, where incentives 1=n
and employment are inextricably linked, the budget-breaker can set the two independently.
Our results for the rm are driven by two fundamental aspects of the model. First, the
budget-breaker can increase eort with an increase in incentives and/or an increase in
employment. This is because the expected marginal benet of eort is the piece rate times
3 Bose, Pal, and Sappington (2010) show that equal division contracts can be optimal to prevent
sabotage, Bartling and von Siemens (2010) because of inequity aversion, and in Levin and Tadelis (2005)
for reasons of \stability." Encinosa, Gaynor, and Rebitzer (2007) document the prevalence of equal division
contracts among medical group practices and Lang and Gordon (1995) among law rms in the form of the
lock-step system.
2the marginal product of eort, which depends on the degree of specialization. An increase
in incentives increases the former, while an increase in employment increases the latter. The
second is that incentives and employment are substitutes, so the budget-breaker adjusts
them in opposite directions. The model therefore predicts that larger rms oer weaker
incentives. Indirect evidence is provided by Brown and Medo (1989) and Rasmusen and
Zenger (1990).
In standard agency theory with one agent, the principal decreases incentives below
their rst best (or ownership) level to reduce the agent's exposure to risk. In our model,
however, the budget-breaker has a choice: she can reduce the aggregate risk premium
with either weaker incentives (which reduce individual risk premia) or a smaller team size
(which reduces the number of risk premia). We show that the former is optimal because (i)
the aggregate risk premium is convex in incentives but only linear in employment and (ii)
the marginal rate of substitution between incentives and employment implied by incentive
compatibility favors employment because of increasing returns to specialization. Since the
two are substitutes, the budget-breaker increases employment above the rst best level
while she reduces incentives. Our result that the capitalist rm promotes an excessive
division of labor is also a central theme in the Marxist literature on labor processes, with
some supporting evidence.
In Holmstr om, the budget-breaker solves the teams problem by strengthening weak
partnership incentives, which contradicts the stylized fact that incentives are weak in
rms (see Pendergast (1999)). In contrast, in our model the budget-breaker solves the
teams problem with an increase in employment and oers incentives that are weaker than
the optimal EDP incentive. The result that incentives are weaker and shirking more
prevalent in the rm rather than the partnership represents a complete reversal of roles
vis- a-vis the classical literature. In our model, the role of the budget-breaker is not to oer
strong incentives but rather to reduce agents' exposure to risk and promote and coordinate
specialization and the division of labor.
The model is consistent with several stylized facts about size-related dierences across
rms, where size is measured in terms of employment. First, there is some evidence that
incentives decline with rm size, as noted earlier. Second, large rms tend to have more
3specialized workers, a more extensive division of labor, and higher transaction costs (e.g.,
more hierarchical layers and more explicit rules and procedures) as assumed in Becker
and Murphy. Third, larger rms pay higher wages. Brown and Medo (1989) show that
only about half of this size-wage eect can be explained by dierences in worker quality
and that existing explanations cannot account for the residual. Fourth, large rms tend
to operate in more concentrated industries and to be more capital intensive (Kalleberg
and Van Buren (1996)). In our model, we show that an increase in price and/or an
exogenous improvement in the production technology lead to an increase in employment
(size), specialization, division of labor, transaction costs, and wages (expected total pay)
but a decrease in incentives. The model is therefore consistent with the above stylized
facts if greater concentration implies higher prices and greater capital intensity reects
investments in production technology.
In The Modern Firm, Roberts (2004) documents a major shift in rms' strategies and
organizational structures driven in part by increased global competition and technological
progress. Although many complementary variables and processes are involved, two key
features of the new paradigm are a more intensive use of incentives and a reduced emphasis
on returns to scale, specialization, and the division of labor. In our model, we show
that a reduction in price and the level of risk (the variance of the productivity shock)
induce stronger incentives but less specialization and division of labor. The model is
therefore consistent with these trends if increased global competition corresponds to lower
prices and technological progress (in the form of improved information and data-processing
technology) to easier performance measurement, as Roberts himself suggests.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. We characterize the rst best in
section 2 and introduce moral hazard in section 3. In section 4, we consider the EDP and
the rm in section 5. We provide a tractable example in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2. The First Best
We start with the rst best. There is a continuum S = [0;1] of tasks, which permits
an arbitrarily ne division of labor. Each task can be performed by at most one worker.
4Output in task s is given by
qs = Bl
ses; (1)
where B > 0 and 0   < 1 are technological parameters, ls is the time spent learning
about the task, and es is production eort. In Becker and Murphy (1992) the production




To incorporate moral hazard, in this paper we consider the more general stochastic Leontief
production technology Q = y + , where  is normally distributed with mean zero and
variance 2.4 We refer to the latter as objective risk.
Assume n > 0 identical agents. Let Si  S be the set of tasks assigned to agent i,





i's total eort across all assigned tasks. We now derive the ecient allocation of a given




















Ti should be allocated equally across assigned tasks. Let i be the proportion of tasks












4 Output is therefore negative with positive probability. As in Holmstr om and Milgrom (1991), we
could assume instead that output is deterministic Q = y but non-contractible, and that contracts can only
be based on the signal y+ (which can legitimately take negative values), where  has the same properties.
Our results would be unaected.









This production technology has two features traditionally associated with specialization
and the division of labor which will be important in what follows. First, (8) exhibits
increasing marginal and average returns to eort Ti when  > 1. Second, these returns are
increasing in the degree 1=i of specialization.
Let N > 1 be the size of the labor pool, while 0  n  N is the number actually
employed. All agents are identical and we ignore integer constraints throughout the paper.
In Becker and Murphy, agents are endowed with a xed unit of labor. In this paper we
allow for elastic supply, where C(Ti) is the cost of eort. Following Becker and Murphy, we
assume that larger teams incur higher transaction costs K(k;n), where k > 0 is a parameter
which increases marginal transaction costs. These include the costs of communicating task
assignments and coordinating the assembly of intermediate outputs into nal output. We
assume C and K satisfy the following properties.




(ii) f(0) = 0, f0 > 0 on (0;1), and f(Ti) ! 1 as Ti ! 1. (iii) K(k;0) = Kn(k;0) = 0,
Kn > 0 for all n > 0, and Knn > 0 for all n  0. (iv) Kkn  0.
The expression for f in (9) is the ratio of the marginal cost and expected marginal
productivity of eort (see (8)) after normalizing for A and the task assignment i. Since
expected output increases at an increasing rate, the agents' optimal eorts will be innite
unless marginal costs increase suciently fast. The requirement in (ii) that f is increasing
and unbounded ensures this. The rest of the assumptions are standard. The following
common functional forms satisfy all of the above conditions
C(Ti) = (1=2)T2
i (10)
K(k;n) = (1=2)kn2: (11)
6Let p > 0 be the price of output. The rst best or social planner's problem is to choose
the team size n, task assignments fign
i=1, and eorts fTign
i=1 to maximize the expected
total surplus
V (n;fig;fTig) = py  
X
i
C(Ti)   K(k;n) (12)
subject to the constraint 0  n  N. Let nf denote the rst best optimal team size.





where g = f 1, and the rst best task assignment is an equal division of labor i = 1=n











If 4=3 <  < 2 then nf = N when n0

















2   k (16)
then nf = nc
f when nc
f  N and nf = N otherwise.
The rst result gives the rst best total eort and division of labor in the usual case
where team size n is given and exogenous. The rst best eort T(n) in (13) is increasing
in n because a larger team is more specialized with higher expected marginal productivity,
so the planner chooses greater eort. Substituting i = 1=n and T(n) into (12), we obtain
the expected total surplus solely as a function of employment
V (n) = V [n;f1=ng;fT(n)g]: (17)
The rst best employment level nf maximizes (17) subject to the constraint 0  n  N.
7The rest of Proposition 1 characterizes the rst best employment level nf under the
specic functional forms in (10) and (11). The central tradeo is between the increasing
returns to specialization and the transaction costs associated with larger teams. We refer
to this as the Becker-Murphy tradeo, which will be augmented under moral hazard. When
the returns to specialization are suciently high 4=3 <  < 2, expected total surplus V (n)
is U-shaped, where nc
f in (15) is the global minimizer and n0
f in (14) is the break-even
employment level. In that case, the planner shuts down when N < n0
f and employs the
entire labor pool otherwise. When returns are suciently low 1   < 4=3, expected total
surplus is hill-shaped with a global unconstrained maximum at nc
f, which is the global
constrained maximizer when nc
f  N. The condition in (16) ensures that expected total
surplus is positive at n = 1, so the planner operates. Note that nc
f is increasing in A and
p and decreasing in the transaction cost parameter k as is intuitive. Since the case where
increasing returns dominate is not very interesting, we assume 1   < 4=3 and N = 1
for the rest of the paper.
The model therefore predicts that larger teams will be more specialized, with a more
extensive division of labor and higher transaction costs. Since this result follows directly
from eciency in production, it is not institution-specic and will also hold for partnerships
and rms below. These predictions are consistent with the robust empirical nding that
rm size is positively correlated with division of labor and vertical dierentiation (i.e.,
the number of hierarchical layers); see Beyer and Trice (1979), Kalleberg and Van Buren
(1996), and the survey by Carter and Keon (1986).
3. Moral Hazard
We now introduce moral hazard into the Becker-Murphy framework. Following the teams
literature, we assume individual performance measures are unavailable and that only nal
output Q is contractible. We compare two institutions: (i) a rm with a budget-breaker
(referred to as simply the rm), who oers a linear contract Ii = i + iQ to each worker
i, where Ii is income, i a lump sum (which can be negative), and i the incentive and (ii)
an equal-division partnership (EDP) with zero lump-sum transfers i = 0 and an equal
8division of labor i = 1=n, revenue i = p=n, and transaction costs.5
We do not oer a novel explanation for the existence of partnerships. If the parameters
(A;k;p;) are the same for both institutions then EDP expected prots cannot be higher
than the rm because the budget-breaker is free to choose the same employment level,
incentive contract, and task assignments. The EDP is therefore inecient unless the
parameters favor it. For example, Garicano and Santos (2004) show that partnerships can
address the moral hazard and adverse selection problems associated with matching workers
to opportunities (referrals) more eectively than market arrangements. Levin and Tadelis
(2005) show that an EDP hires better workers than a budget-breaker and therefore may
be more ecient when consumers are uncertain about product quality. In our model, the
productivity parameter A and p may be higher in an EDP for similar reasons.
The agents' utility functions are negative exponential
 expf r[Ii   C(Ti)]g; (18)
where r > 0 is the coecient of absolute risk aversion. The corresponding certainty
equivalent is given by6
Ui = i + iy   C(Ti)   (1=2)s2
i : (19)
The rst two terms constitute expected income as a function of expected output. The
nal term is the agent's risk premium, which reects the disutility of risk. It is increasing
in both subjective risk s = r2 (objective risk scaled by the agents' risk aversion) and
incentives because stronger incentives link income more closely to stochastic nal output.
The timing of the game is as follows. (i) A budget-breaker chooses the number n of
workers, the contracts f(i;i)g, and task assignments fig. In an EDP, the sole choice
variable is partnership size n because incentives i = p=n and task assignments i = 1=n
are otherwise xed institutional features. (ii) Agents who receive oers decide whether or
not to accept them. We assume that all agents have an outside option of zero and indierent
5 Linear contracts are quite common in actual organizations (see footnote 3) and can be justied on
various grounds. In the case of a single agent with limited liability, Bose, Pal, and Sappington (2011)
show that the optimal linear contract secures at least 90% of the expected prots of the optimal nonlinear
second best contract. A linear contract will therefore be optimal when transaction costs are suciently
increasing in contractual complexity.
6 Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, p. 137) provide a detailed derivation.
9agents accept. (iii) The agents who accepted choose their eorts non-cooperatively. (iv)
Output is realized and the contract is executed. A budget-breaker chooses n to maximize
her expected prots. As in Lang and Gordon (1995) and Levin and Tadelis, an EDP
chooses n to maximize the representative partner's expected payo. The following result
characterizes the set of equilibria in eorts in stage (iii) for both institutions.
Lemma 1. (i) Given n > 0, fig, and fig such that i > 0 and i > 0 for all i, there is
a continuum of equilibria in the third stage of the game, one of which is Pareto dominant
from the perspective of the workers.7 (ii) If i =  and i = 1=n for all i, the Pareto
dominant equilibrium is
Ti = g(An) (20)
for all i. (iii) [Legros and Matthews (1993)] In an EDP, the eort-employment relationship
is the same as the rst best (13) in the Pareto dominant equilibrium.
The rst result follows directly from the stochastic Leontief production technology.
Clearly, one equilibrium is for all agents to exert zero eort. In the proof (see the appendix),
we show that the Pareto dominant equilibrium is the eort prole which generates the
highest incentive compatible level of expected output, with a continuum of equilibria in
between. From now on, we assume that all players prior to stage (iii) believe that the
Pareto dominant equilibrium will obtain with probability one. This is the most reasonable
assumption to make, especially in the rm where all parties (including the budget-breaker)
have a similar incentive to coordinate and where the budget-breaker as the central party
to all contracts can easily perform this function.
The second result is one of the main insights of the paper: an increase in eort can
be achieved with an increase in incentives  and/or an increase in employment n. This is
because the agents' expected marginal benet of eort is the piece rate  times the expected
marginal product of eort. Given an equal division of labor, an increase in employment
leads to a greater degree of specialization and higher expected marginal productivity and
therefore induces greater eort.
7 I.e., all workers are strictly better o as compared with any other equilibrium.
10The third result is similar to Legros and Matthews (1993, Example B), with one crucial
distinction. In the case where n is exogenous, Legros and Matthews show that partnerships
can achieve the rst best under general conditions which include a deterministic Leontief
production function. The dierence is that team size is endogenous in our model and EDP
eorts are rst best if and only if EDP employment is rst best. In the next section, we
show that this is generally not the case. The result does show, however, that equal-division
incentives are high-powered or market incentives in the sense that they induce the rst
best eort-employment relationship.
4. Equal Division Partnerships
In an EDP, there are no lump-sum transfers and revenue, tasks, and transaction costs are
all shared equally. After substituting the incentive compatibility constraint T(n) in (13),
the certainty equivalent payo of the representative partner becomes
Up(n) = (1=n)py   C[T(n)]   (1=2)s(p=n)2   (1=n)K(k;n)
= (1=n)V (n)   (1=2)s(p=n)2; (21)
where V (n) is the rst best expected surplus dened in (17). Let np denote the optimal
EDP employment level (the maximizer for (21)) and Tp = T(np) optimal EDP eort. We
rst consider the case of zero subjective risk (i.e., risk neutrality and/or zero objective
risk) so we can compare an EDP in our model with the deterministic cases in Holmstr om
and Legros and Matthews where team size is exogenous.










where np < nf and Tp < Tf.
When subjective risk is zero, we obtain a sharp result: an EDP is ineciently small
with shirking relative to the rst best. Although consistent with Alchian and Demsetz,
where partnerships are small to limit free-riding, the logic is actually the reverse. As in
11Legros and Matthews, the eort-employment relationship T(n) is the same as the rst best.
It follows that the immediate distortion is not moral hazard but rather the Levin-Tadelis
1=n problem which distorts the Becker-Murphy tradeo V (n) in (21) and causes an EDP
to be ineciently small. Unlike Levin and Tadelis, who focus on worker selection issues
rather than moral hazard, in our model this results in less specialization, lower expected
productivity, and therefore less eort. In Alchian and Demsetz, partnerships are small
to control shirking, whereas in our model shirking occurs because partnerships are small.
The result also shows that the conclusions in Legros and Matthews can break down when
team size is endogenous. An EDP is ecient when team size is exogenous, but inecient
otherwise because EDP employment is less than rst best.
We now return to the case of positive subjective risk, which introduces a risk-reward
tradeo into (21), in addition to the Becker-Murphy tradeo V (n) and the 1=n problem.







2   k + sp2: (23)
(i) There is a unique solution np > 0 for (21) which is increasing in A, p, and s and
decreasing in k. (ii) (comparison with the rst best)












A unique interior solution exists, but we can no longer provide a closed-form expression
for it as in Lemma 2. The comparative statics for A, k, and p are intuitively clear and
already reected in (22). The new result is that an increase in subjective risk s leads to an
increase in optimal EDP employment, which reduces the equal-division incentive and hence
the representative partner's exposure to risk. The comparison with the rst best shows
that the characterization of the partnership in Alchian and Demsetz as ineciently small
and prone to shirking is not robust and depends on s. In particular, an EDP is ineciently
large when subjective risk is suciently high in the sense of (24). In that case, optimal
EDP eort will exceed the rst best because eort (13) is increasing in employment. The
condition in (23) ensures Up  0 at the optimum.
12Garicano and Hubbard (2009) study the division of labor in rms and markets using
data on law partnerships. They distinguish between individual and ex post law elds like
criminal law, where the client usually contacts the rm after the fact, and ex ante elds
like banking, corporate, and tax law, where the client is often proactive. They nd that
the division of labor among individual and ex post elds is coordinated by the market,
but within the rm among ex ante elds. Since ex ante elds dier substantively from
one another with positively correlated demands, explanations based on mutual monitoring
and risk-sharing seem implausible.8 A more likely explanation is the theory of referrals
in Garicano and Santos (2004), which shows that partnerships can address the adverse
selection and moral hazard issues associated with matching individuals to tasks more
eciently than the market. These issues are more salient in ex ante elds where the
client's problem often requires an initial diagnosis and subsequent referral by an expert.
Our model is highly complementary with theirs in the sense that an institution which
is superior at allocating individuals to tasks based on comparative advantage should also
be superior at coordinating a division of labor in a team production context. Indeed, Lang
and Gordon (1995) note that complex corporate cases usually involve teams of lawyers
from dierent specialities. While the fact that the average law rm in the United States
is quite small (3.65 lawyers) is consistent with the free-riding explanation in Alchian and
Demsetz, the fact that the size distribution is highly skewed to the right, with the largest
law rms having a thousand or more partners, suggests that other forces may be at work.
From the perspective of Proposition 2, this is consistent with a large number of small law
rms handling low-risk 2 low-reward p cases with a minimal division of labor, and a small
number of large law rms handling cases of the opposite type with an extensive division
of labor.
5. The Firm
We now introduce a budget-breaker. The rm's prot equals revenue less the payments to
8 It is important to distinguish between risk-sharing in the portfolio sense (which is how Garicano and
Hubbard use the term) and the risk-reward tradeo. Indeed, in our model the demands for the outputs of
individual workers are perfectly positively correlated, but an increase in team size nevertheless reduces the
workers' exposure to risk. Gaynor and Gertler (1995) nd evidence for the risk-reward tradeo in medical
partnerships, in that incentives are decreasing in the average risk aversion in the group.




Ii   K(k;n): (25)
The budget-breaker chooses the number n of workers, the contracts f(i;i)g, and task




(i + iy)   K(k;n) (26)
subject to incentive compatibility (the Pareto dominant equilibrium in Lemma 1) and the
participation constraints Ui  0, where Ui was dened in (19). The lump sums i are
chosen to make the participation constraints bind. Substituting these into (26),







i   K(k;n): (27)
We assume the following condition for the rest of the paper.
Assumption 2. For all 1   < 4=3 and Ti > 0,
4f0 + Tif00  0: (28)
This condition is crucial for our next result, which simplies the analysis considerably.
Note that the quadratic cost function in (10) satises both Assumptions 1 and 2.
Lemma 3. Assume a given number n > 0 of agents. Given any prole of incentives fig
and task assignments fig, the budget-breaker can achieve the same expected output but
higher expected prots with an equal division of labor and an incentive  which is the
same for all agents.
The intuition is as follows. Let fTig be the Pareto dominant equilibrium corresponding
to the given incentives fig and task assignment fig. Since expected output is Leontief,
it may be possible to implement fTig with weaker incentives. Let fi(i)g be the weakest
incentive prole that implements fTig (see (A.17) in the appendix). If necessary, the
budget-breaker can increase expected prot by reducing the original incentives to fi(i)g.
The minimum incentive i(i) is increasing in i because an increase in the latter reduces
14specialization and expected marginal productivity and therefore requires an increase in
incentives to maintain the desired eort Ti. As shown in the proof, (28) ensures that
i(i)2 is a convex function of i, so an increase in i above 1=n increases the risk premium
in (27) at an increasing rate. The budget-breaker therefore chooses an equal division of
labor. The idea of the proof is to show that
P
i i(i)2 behaves like a Herndahl index
with \market shares" i, so \concentration" is minimized with equal market shares. This
implies the same incentive for all agents. The main consequence is that we can re-write








Proposition 3 below formalizes another central insight of the paper. Its statement
involves concepts from lattice programming formally dened in the appendix. Let F(x;a)
be a twice continuously dierentiable function of a vector x of choice variables and a vector
a of parameters. The variables xi and xj are strategic complements if @2F=@xi@xj  0
on the entire domain of F, so an increase in xi increases the marginal eect of xj and
vice-versa. The function F is supermodular in x with increasing dierences in (x;a) if
@2F=@xi@xj  0 for all i 6= j and @2F=@ak@xi  0 for all i and k. In that case, an
increase in the parameter ak will induce an increase in the maximizers xi for all i. If
@2F=@xi@xj  0 then xi and xj are strategic substitutes. After a change of variable, xi
and zj = 1=xj are strategic complements.
We want to show that employment n and eort T are strategic complements, while
 is a substitute for n and T. The problem is that the relevant cross-partials do not have
the appropriate signs on the entire domain of , which necessitates the more complicated
statement below. What we can show is that there exists a subset S of the constraint
set which has the following properties: (i) S is a lattice (dened in the appendix), (ii)
the optimum lies in S for all permissible values of the parameters (A;k;p;s), and (iii) 
is supermodular in (z;n;T) with increasing dierences in (z;n;T) and (p;w) on S (but
not on the entire domain of ), where z = 1= and w = 1=k. It follows that incentives
and employment are substitutes at the optimum, so a reduction in price or an increase
in communication costs induces the budget-breaker to reduce employment and increase
incentives.
15Proposition 3. Assume 1   < 4=3 and that the rm's problem has a unique interior







S = f(z;n;T)j z > 0;n > 0;and T = h(z;n)g (31)
is a lattice which contains the optimum for all A;k;p;s > 0. (ii)  in (29) is supermodular
in (z;n;T) with increasing dierences in (z;n;T) and (p;w) for all
(z;n;T;p;w) 2 S  [(1=);1)  (0;1): (32)
(iii) In particular, n and T are increasing and  decreasing in p and w.
To understand the mechanics of the model, consider an increase in price p. From the
incentive compatibility constraint (20), the budget-breaker can increase expected output
by increasing employment n and/or increasing incentives . In the standard linear model
with one agent and quadratic cost of eort (10), the optimal incentive is  = p=(1 + s)
(see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, p. 139)), so an increase in price leads to an increase in
incentives. In our model, however, the budget-breaker has a choice and instead increases
employment. This follows from two aspects of the structure of expected prots in (29).
First, incentives and employment are strategic substitutes in terms of the aggregate risk
premium, so an increase in one will be associated with a decrease in the other to reduce the
agents' exposure to risk. Second, employment and eort are strategic complements in the
production function, so the budget-breaker will change both in the same direction when
the price is high enough (note the condition p  1= in (32)). Since the budget-breaker
desires more output, she will increase n and T and reduce  to reduce the aggregate risk
premium. The overall eect of the increase in specialization and reduction in incentives is
to increase eort.
The closest result in the literature is Lin (1997), who considers two risk-neutral agents
and a deterministic production function which can be linear in eorts or Leontief. He
shows that the incentives which implement the rst best are lower in the Leontief case
16where eorts are complementary, so incentives have positive spillovers. He also shows that
the rst best incentives are lower when the number of agents is exogenously increased
from two to four. The same eect is evident in (20), augmented by the increasing returns
 to specialization, where a given level of eort can be achieved with lower incentives
when employment is higher. In our model with uncertainty and risk aversion, incentives
and employment are substitutes not because of the Lin eect but rather because of their
relationship with the aggregate risk premium.
The existing evidence is highly indirect but nevertheless consistent with our prediction
that larger rms oer weaker incentives (i.e., that n and  are substitutes). Rasmusen
and Zenger (1990) show (their lemma 1) that smaller rms are more ecient at detecting
shirking in a purely statistical sense (they do not model optimal incentives or employment).
They therefore predict that small rms will compensate more on the basis of performance,
while large rms will emphasize easily observable employee characteristics such as tenure.
Empirically, they nd that the positive relationship between wages and tenure is stronger
in large rms. Furthermore, regressions of weekly earnings on tenure, outside experience,
and education have a larger residual variance for small rms, which is consistent with
the hypothesis that small rms reward performance instead. Brown and Medo (1989, p.
1054) nd that the standard deviation of wages is smaller at large rms after controlling
for the wider range of occupations, which is also consistent with weaker incentives.
For purposes of comparison with the rst best and an EDP, we express expected












The budget-breaker therefore chooses n  0 and T  0 to maximize (32). We now contrast
the rm's optimum (nb;Tb) with the rst best solution (nf;Tf) under some basic regularity
conditions.
Proposition 4. Assume a unique interior optimum (ni;Ti) for i = b;f. If there exists
an open convex subset of [0;1)  [0;1) which contains both solutions and where (33) is
strictly concave then nb > nf, Tb < Tf, and b < p=nf.
17According to this result, the rm is ineciently large nb > nf with less than rst best
eort Tb < Tf. Although the budget-breaker could oer the incentive  = p=nf which
implements the rst best eort in (13), she instead oers weaker incentives to reduce the
agents' exposure to risk. This result generalizes the standard risk-reward tradeo in the
sense that now the budget-breaker has a choice: she can reduce the aggregate risk premium
in (29) with high incentives and low employment or the reverse. In our model, the budget-
breaker chooses high employment and low incentives for two reasons. First, the marginal
rate of substitution for the iso-eort curve dened by the incentive compatibility constraint
(20) favors high employment when there are increasing returns  > 1 to specialization. To
see this, consider the option of high incentives and low employment. When  > 1, the
budget-breaker can achieve the same eort level with a lower aggregate risk premium with
a large decrease in incentives and a small increase in employment. A similar statement
holds for the high employment option, but the marginal rate of substitution is smaller in
absolute terms. Second, the aggregate risk premium is convex in incentives but only linear
in team size, which also favors the high employment option. The overall eect of weaker
incentives but greater specialization is shirking relative to the rst best.
The assumed regularity conditions are fairly mild. Note that we do not require global
strict concavity of (33), which generally fails, but rather local strict concavity on a convex
neighborhood which contains both solutions. Under these assumptions, we can use the
relevant rst-order conditions to compare the rm's optimum with the rst best. An
example is provided in the next section.
We therefore obtain the novel result that rms promote excessive specialization and
division of labor relative to the rst best. As far as we know, the only literature which
makes similar claims is the Marxist literature on labor processes initiated by Braverman
(1974). Braverman's main contention is that capitalists use machinery and the division of
labor not only to improve productivity, but also to divide the work into simpler components
so they can reduce wages and achieve greater control over the production process. In
contrast, in the example in the next section we show that an increase in the productivity
parameter A (e.g., an investment in machinery) leads to an increase in specialization and
the division of labor and a reduction in incentives, but an increase in wages (i.e., expected
18pay). Wallace and Kalleberg (1982) and Borghans and Bas ter Weel (2006) (in the case
of fast computer adopters) nd evidence for Braverman's de-skilling hypothesis, although
the latter paper does not belong to the Marxist literature and is seemingly unaware of it.
Following Holmstr om (1982), we now compare rms and partnerships. In Holmstr om,
the partnership is dened as a budget-balanced sharing rule, where the payments to workers
sum to revenue. An example is the equal-division sharing rule in this paper. He rst shows
(his theorem 1) that budget-balanced sharing rules cannot achieve the rst best because
agents receive less than their full marginal products. As in Alchian and Demsetz, the
partnership is therefore prone to free-riding.
The result indicates that in closed (budget-balanced) organizations like a labor-managed rm
or a partnership, free-rider problems are likely to lead to an insucient supply of productive inputs
like eort. This observation is the starting point for Alchian and Demsetz' (1972) well-known
theory of the rm. They argue that the ineciency of a partnership will cause an organizational
change. To secure a sucient supply of eort, rms should hire a principal to monitor the behavior
of agents. The monitor should be given title to the net earnings of the rm so that he has the
proper incentives to work. Such an arrangement will restore eciency. At the same time, it will
change the partnership into a capitalistic rm with the monitor acting eectively as the owner.
There is a simpler solution, however, at least under certainty.
(p. 327)
The simpler solution is a Mirrlees contract, which imposes group penalties when a specied
output level is not achieved (theorem 2). Alternatively, the budget-breaker can implement
the rst best with ownership incentives (see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, p. 302-3)),
where agents are paid their full marginal products and the principal extracts the entire
surplus with up-front fees. In the case of uncertainty, a Mirrlees contract can approximate
the rst best arbitrarily closely (theorem 3). In each case, the role of the budget-breaker
is the same: to provide strong incentives.
Empirically, the role of the budget-breaker in Holmstr om conicts with the well-known
stylized fact that incentives are weak in rms (see Prendergast (1999)). From a theoretical
perspective, we now show that the result is not robust and that the role of the budget-
breaker is fundamentally altered when employment as well as incentives is chosen in the
context of uncertainty, specialization, and the division of labor.
Proposition 5. Assume a unique interior optimum (ni;Ti) for i = b;p and 1 <  < 4=3
or Up > 0 at the EDP optimum. If there exists an open convex subset of [0;1)  [0;1)
19which contains both solutions and where (33) is strictly concave then nb > np, b < p=np,
and Tb < Tp.
It is important to distinguish this result from Proposition 4 above: the present one
is stronger when an EDP is ineciently large np > nf and weaker otherwise. The result
that partnerships are smaller than rms np < nb is consistent with Alchian and Demsetz,
but the fact that incentives are weaker b < p=np and shirking more prevalent Tb < Tp
in the rm represents a complete reversal from Holmstr om. In our model, the role of the
budget-breaker is to promote and coordinate specialization and the division of labor and
to reduce the agents' exposure to risk rather than to provide strong incentives.
The rst element in the intuition is that the budget-breaker can choose incentives
and team size independently, whereas in an EDP the employment decision simultaneously
determines equal-division incentives. The second is the insight in Legros and Matthews
that partnerships oer rst best incentives when output is deterministic Leontief and
team size is exogenous. Note that the Leontief assumption is quite natural in a division
of labor context, where the production process is broken into smaller components which
are subsequently assembled into nal output. Likewise, in our model the EDP incentive
induces the same eort-employment relationship as the rst best (Lemma 1(iii)). Unlike
Alchian and Demsetz and Holmstr om, the problem is not that EDP incentives are too
weak, but that they are too strong. The budget-breaker therefore oers weaker incentives
to reduce the agents' exposure to risk. At the same time, unencumbered by the 1=n
problem, the budget-breaker increases employment above the EDP level, so that rms
exhibit a greater degree of specialization and division of labor. The overall eect of weaker
incentives and greater employment is shirking relative to an EDP.
6. Example and Further Comparative Statics
This example serves two purposes. First, it provides an instance where the regularity
conditions in Propositions 4 and 5 are satised and can be given economic content. Second,
it allows us to derive further comparative statics results which can be compared with several
institutional stylized facts and recent organizational trends.
20Assume  = 1 and the functional forms in (10) and (11). From (13) and (15), the rst
best solution is Tf = Ap and nf = (Ap)2=(2k). In an EDP, the certainty equivalent payo
of the representative partner is
Up = pAT   (1=2)T2   (1=2)s(p=n)2   (1=2)kn; (34)
with solution Tp = Tf = Ap and np = (2p2s=k)1=3. Note that most of Proposition 2 above
continues to hold when  = 1. In particular, np is increasing in price p and subjective risk
s and decreasing in the transaction cost parameter k. Furthermore, np < nf when s is
suciently low and ineciently large otherwise. If
A6p4  (27=4)sk2 (35)
then Up  0 at the optimum and the EDP will operate. The budget-breaker's expected
prot is




From (20), the incentive compatibility constraint is T = An.
Lemma 4. (i) If
A6p4 > 4sk2 (37)
then in this example the budget-breaker's problem has a unique interior solution with
positive expected prots. (ii) If (35) holds and s is suciently small then there exists an
open convex subset of [0;1)[0;1) which contains (ni;Ti) for i = b;f;p and where (33)
is strictly concave.





is a sucient condition for the rm's expected prots in (33) to be strictly concave in n
and T. As required, (38) denes an open convex subset of the nonnegative orthant. Since
Tf = Tp = Ap, the rst best and EDP solutions clearly satisfy the condition. Furthermore,
(38) does not depend on s and (nb;Tb) ! (nf;Tf) as s ! 0, so the rm's solution will
also satisfy the condition when s is suciently small. In that case, the open convex region
21dened by (38) will contain all three solutions and the hypotheses of Propositions 4 and 5
will all be satised.
In Proposition 3 above, we derived the rm's comparative statics results with respect
to k and p. We now consider the two remaining parameters A and subjective risk s.















Note that  is increasing in n for all 0  n 
p
s=A and decreasing thereafter, so an
exogenous increase in employment can increase incentives when employment is low. In
contrast, Proposition 3 shows that incentives and employment move in opposite directions
when team size is endogenous because the budget-breaker never chooses employment in
the range 0  n 
p
s=A. Likewise, an increase in p leads to an increase in  when n is
exogenous (as in standard agency theory) but not when it is endogenous.
Substituting (40) into (39), we obtain the rm's expected prots
 =
n2(A4p2n   A2kn2   ks)
2(A2n2 + s)
(41)
solely as a function of employment n. From (41), it is a simple matter to solve for the
maximizer nb numerically.9
Numerical Result 1. (i) An increase in A or p increases n, T, and expected pay +y
and decreases . (ii) An increase in k increases  and decreases n, T, and expected pay.
(iii) An increase in s decreases , T, and expected pay and increases n.
An improvement in productivity A (e.g., an investment in machinery) or an increase
in price p leads to an increase in employment n and eort T because these parameters and
9 Although Mathematica does provide a closed-form solution for (41), the expression is complicated and
ill-behaved because of rounding errors. We instead used Solve to nd the zeros of the rst-order condition
for (41) and chose the largest one in accordance with the proof of Lemma 4. We then substituted the
global maximizer nb into (40) to nd b and both solutions into the incentive compatibility constraint to
nd Tb. The Mathematica notebook is available at http://web.me.com/mtrauh/Site/Welcome.html.
22variables are complementary in production. At the same time, the budget-breaker reduces
incentives  which are substitutes for employment. A decrease in subjective risk s (e.g., an
improvement in monitoring technology which makes performance easier to measure) leads
to stronger incentives  because of the risk-reward tradeo and a reduction in employment.
The overall eect is to increase eort.10
These results are consistent with a constellation of stylized facts related to rm size,
measured in terms of employment. As previously discussed, size is positively correlated
with division of labor and vertical dierentiation (see section 1) and negatively correlated
with incentives (this section). Large rms also tend to pay higher wages, which is referred
to as the size-wage eect. For example, Brown and Medo (1989) nd that establishment
and company size have independent positive eects on wages and that worker quality only
explains about one-half of the size premium. Kalleberg and Van Buren (1996) note that
large rms tend to be more capital intensive (p. 50) and nd that size, wages, formalization
(explicit rules and procedures), and industry concentration are all positively correlated.
Our comparative statics results are consistent with these ndings if greater capital intensity
is associated with higher A and greater concentration with higher prices p because such
rms will be larger; with greater specialization and a more extensive division of labor;
higher transaction costs (e.g., formalization and vertical dierentiation); weaker incentives;
and higher wages.
Note that most of these correlations vanish in the Kalleberg and Van Buren regressions
which control for size. Likewise, Brown and Medo nd that concentration (proxied by
industry dummies) has no eect on the size-wage relationship. The problem with such
regressions which include size as an independent variable is that size is endogenous and
may therefore soak up the explanatory power of the parameters. We should also point out
that not all of our results are consistent with the empirical literature. A notable exception
is the nding by Kalleberg and Van Buren that wages are positively correlated with the
10 We were unable to prove the comparative statics results for A in the context of Proposition 3 above
because we have not been able to show that the incentive compatibility constraint is increasing in A in
the sense of Veinott (see Vives (1999, p. 23)). Since the relevant cross-partial conditions do not hold
(see (iii) where n and T move in opposite directions), we cannot use the lattice programming methods
of Proposition 3 to derive the comparative statics results for subjective risk s. In both cases, we were
therefore forced to resort to numerical methods.
23diculty of measuring performance, whereas in our model expected pay is decreasing in
subjective risk.
In The Modern Firm, Roberts (2004) documents relatively recent fundamental shifts in
rms' strategies and organizational structures driven by increased global competition, more
demanding capital markets, and technological advances in communication, data processing,
exible production technologies, and transportation (also see Lindbeck and Snower (1996,
2000)). The main features of the new paradigm include: outsourcing and a focus on
the rm's core competencies; cooperative relationships with external suppliers; within the
rm, small business units and more intensive incentives; a shift away from mass production
(specialization, division of labor, and returns to scale) towards modern manufacturing
(short production runs, broad human capital, and employee initiative); downsizing and
delayering (e.g., fewer hierarchical layers); and training and development. An example of
the old paradigm is Ford in the Model T era, while Toyota exemplies the new (Roberts
(2004, p. 48-49)).
Our model is too simple to capture all of these aspects, but it does address the two
central themes related to incentives and the division of labor. In our model, a reduction
in price p due to an increase in competition would lead to an increase in incentives and a
decrease in specialization and division of labor. Roberts himself suggests that improved
information and data-processing systems have made performance measurement easier and
tipped the risk-reward tradeo in the direction of stronger incentives. The same eect
is also present in our model, where a reduction in 2 with risk aversion r held constant
decreases subjective risk s = r2 and increases incentives, but also reduces specialization
and the division of labor. A coarser division of labor should also result in delayering and
a reduction in the transaction costs associated with communication, coordination, and
supervision. To be consistent with these trends, these forces would have to be stronger
than those associated with improvements in communication (a reduction in k), which
would have the opposite eect on incentives and employment.
Lindbeck and Snower (1996, 2000) are concerned with the same issue as this paper:
the division of labor within the rm. In their model, there are two types of workers,
1 and 2, and two tasks, 1 and 2, which are complementary in production. A type i
24worker has a comparative advantage in the performance of task i (workers are otherwise
identical). After paying the workers' reservation wage, the rm allocates them between the
two tasks. This allocation is determined by three forces: (i) the gains from specialization,
(ii) informational task complementarities (productivity in one task is increasing in the
time spent on the other), and (iii) workers' preferences for specialization (as reected in
the reservation wage). A Tayloristic organization is one where type i workers completely
specialize in task i; otherwise the organization is holistic. The authors explain the current
trend towards holism in terms of a reduction in the gains from specialization, stronger
informational task complementarities, stronger preferences for diverse work, and broader
human capital. Their paper is highly complementary to ours in that they consider dierent
tradeos (e.g., informational task complementarities and preferences for diversity in work),
whereas in this paper we incorporate moral hazard and focus on the tradeo between
incentives and specialization.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we extended the classical teams framework in Holmstr om (1982) to the
case where team size is endogenous. Our results essentially reverse Alchian and Demsetz
(1972) and Holmstr om, but are consistent with a sizable body of empirical evidence. A re-
appraisal of the institutions of partnership and rm is therefore warranted. In Becker and
Murphy (1992), the social planner faces a tradeo between the gains from specialization and
the transaction costs associated with larger teams. In our model, the optimal partnership
size balances the risk-reward and Becker-Murphy tradeos, where the latter is distorted
by the 1=n problem. Contrary to Alchian and Demsetz, in our model partnerships are not
necessarily small, either in absolute terms or in comparison with the rst best, nor are they
necessarily characterized by shirking. As in Legros and Matthews (1993), equal division is
a high-powered incentive in the sense that it implements the rst best eort-employment
relationship. Our comparative statics results provide a simple explanation for the size
distribution of partnerships documented in Garicano and Hubbard (2009). The model
complements the theory of referrals in Garicano and Santos (2004) and worker selection
in Levin and Tadelis (2005).
25The rm acquires two novel characteristics when team size is endogenous and workers
can specialize within a division of labor: (i) the budget-breaker can increase eort with
an increase in incentives and/or specialization and (ii) incentives and employment are
substitutes. The latter implies that incentives decline with rm size, which is consistent
with some evidence. In Holmstr om, the role of the budget-breaker is to promote eciency
with high-powered incentives, which is inconsistent with the stylized fact that incentives
are weak in rms. In contrast, in our model the budget-breaker oers incentives that are
weaker than rst best and optimal equal-division incentives, so shirking is more prevalent
in rms than in partnerships. These results reverse the classical depictions of the rm and
partnership. Since incentives and team size are substitutes, the budget-breaker increases
employment above the rst best and optimal partnership levels, so rms are ineciently
large. In our model, the role of the budget-breaker is to reduce agents' exposure to risk
and to promote and coordinate specialization and the division of labor rather than to oer
high-powered incentives. Our comparative statics results are consistent with the empirical
ndings that rm size, wages, specialization and division of labor, capital intensity, and
industry concentration are positively correlated. They are also consistent with recent
organizational trends towards more intensive incentives and a reduced emphasis on returns
to scale, specialization, and division of labor.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We rst prove (i). Fix 0 < n  N. From (8), eciency requires Ti=i = R for all i for
some constant R. Given any such fig and fTig, consider the alternative T = R=n and
 = 1=n which produces the same expected output. By Jensen's inequality,


















26so we can restrict attention to an equal division of labor i = 1=n and Ti the same for all





   nC(T)   K(k;n): (A:3)
Dierentiating with respect to T,
pAn(nT)




Under Assumptions 1, (A.3) has a local minimum at T = 0, increases up to its global





(10), and (11) into (A.3),











V (n) has two zeros, n = 0 and n = n0
f dened in (14). Dierentiating,









with critical points n = 0 and n = nc
f dened in (15). If 4=3 <  < 2 the exponent
(3   4)=(2   ) in (A.6) and (A.7) is positive. It follows that V (n) is negative between
n = 0 and n = n0
f and then positive, increasing, and unbounded thereafter. In that case,
nf = 0 when N < n0
f and nf = N otherwise. If 1   < 4=3 then V (n) is positive between
n = 0 and n = n0
f and then negative, decreasing, and unbounded thereafter. From (A.7),
the slope of V (n) is positive and then negative, so nc
f is the unique global unconstrained
maximum. It is the constrained maximum when it satises 0 < n  N. From (A.6), the
condition in (16) ensures nonnegative expected total surplus when n = 1, so the social
planner operates.
27Proof of Lemma 1
We rst prove (i). Given the choices of the other agents, let y i = infs2S=Si qs (the inmum







the minimum total eort necessary for agent i to produce y i [the solution to (8)]. The
agent's certainty equivalent payo is







  C(Ti)   (1=2)s2
i (A:9)
when Ti  Ty i and
Ui = i + iy i   C(Ti)   (1=2)s2
i (A:10)
















Given our assumptions on f in Assumptions 1, it is clear that (A.9) has a local minimum








The agent's best response is therefore Ti when Ti  Ty i and Ty i otherwise. Clearly,
fTig is a Nash equilibrium which generates expected output y i Ti = Ti;y and Ti;y  Ti
for all i, where Ti;y is the minimum total eort by i necessary to produce y. We can














It follows that there exists a continuum of Nash equilibria corresponding to each y such
that 0  y  mini Yi. Since Ti;y is increasing in y and each agent wants to be as close
to Ti as possible, the Pareto dominant equilibrium corresponds to y = mini Yi. We now
prove (ii). If i =  and i = 1=n for all i then Yi is the same for all i, y = Yi and Ti;y = T
28for all i at the Pareto dominant equilibrium, and (20) follows from (A.12). To prove (iii),
substitute  = p=n into (20) and compare with (13).
Proof of Proposition 2
































This is strictly decreasing in n so Up is strictly concave in n. Since Up
n > 0 for n suciently
small and Up
n < 0 for n suciently large, Up has a unique global maximizer n
p. The
comparative statics results in (i) are clear by inspection of (A.15). To prove (ii), substitute
nc















Since Up is strictly concave in n, nf < np i (A.16) is positive and np < nf i (A.16) is
negative. Re-arranging (A.16) yields (24).
Proof of Lemma 2
The expression in (22) is obtained from (A.15) with s = 0.
Proof of Lemma 3
Fix n > 0. Given fig and fig, let fTig be the corresponding Pareto dominant equilibrium
with expected output y. From the proof of Lemma 1, Ti = Ti;y and Ti;y  Ti for all i,
with equality for those agents with Ti = minj Tj. The budget-breaker can reduce each














(see (A.8) and (A.12)). This increases expected prot in (27) by reducing the agents' risk




Substituting  into (20), the Pareto dominant equilibrium is Ti = T for all i. Substituting
T into (8), expected output is the same as before. We now compare expected prot under
, , and T versus the initial task assignments fig, the improved incentives fig in (A.17),














(2   1)f2 + 2
iz2(f0)2 + izf (4f0 + izf00)

: (A:21)
It follows from (28) that the summand is convex in i and from theorems 1 and 3 in Encaoua
and Jacquemin (1980) that (A.20) is minimized at i =  or i = . The alternative ,
, and T therefore produces the same expected output with lower costs and lower risk
premia.
Since the derivative is dened on open sets and S in (31) is not open, we need denitions for
\supermodularity" and \increasing dierences" which make no reference to dierentiation.
Let R be the space of real numbers. If x = (x1;:::;xn) and y = (y1;:::;yn) are vectors
in Rn then x  y i xi  yi for all i. Let X  Rn. If x;y 2 X then when they exist
x _X y = sup
X
fx;yg
x ^X y = inf
X
fx;yg: (A:22)
X is a lattice if x _X y and x ^X y exist and are in X for all x;y 2 X. X is a sublattice
if x _Rn y and x ^Rn y are in X for all x;y 2 X. If X is a lattice then f : X ! R is
supermodular i
f(x _X y) + f(x ^X y)  f(x) + f(y) (A:23)
30for all x;y 2 X. If T  Rm then f : X  T ! R has increasing dierences on X  T i
f(x;t)   f(x;t0) is increasing in x for all t  t0. If f is twice continuously dierentiable
on X  T these denitions are equivalent to the ones in the text. Standard references on
these topics include Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Vives (1999), and Topkis (1998).
Proof of Proposition 3
Since S is not open, the idea of the proof is to use the relevant cross-partials to establish
supermodularity and increasing dierences on a set ~ S where  is dierentiable and then
restrict the constraint set to S  ~ S. The problem is to choose (;n;T) to maximize (29)
subject to   0, n  0, T  0, and incentive compatibility (20). Substituting (20) into
(29),
 = pAn+1g0 
A(ng) 1   C0
  ns: (A:24)
Assuming a unique interior solution,








so the optimum lies in S for all A;k;p;s > 0.
The relevant cross-partials of (29) are
n =  s  0 nT = pA(nT) 1   C0 T = 0
k = 0 nk =  Knk  0 Tk = 0
p = 0 np = An 1T  0 Tp = AnT 1  0:
(A:26)
Since




after the change of variables z = 1= and w = 1=k the cross-partials have the appropriate
signs on ~ S  (0;1)  (0;1), where ~ S is dened by z > 0, n > 0, T > 0, and (A.27). It is
easy to show that n > 0, T > 0, and (A.27) dene a sublattice in R2 because g is strictly
increasing. Since a product of sublattices is a sublattice,  is supermodular in (z;n;T)
with increasing dierences in (z;n;T) and (p;w) on ~ S  (0;1)  (0;1).
31We now show that S in (31) is a lattice. Let (z1;n1;T1);(z2;n2;T2) 2 S and n1  n2
without loss of generality. We need to show that
(z1;n1;T1) _S (z2;n2;T2) 2 S: (A:28)
Note that h in (30) is strictly increasing in n and weakly decreasing in z. We rst consider
the case z1  z2. If T1  T2 the supremum is clearly (z1;n1;T1) 2 S. If T1 < T2 the
supremum is (z1;n3;T2), where n3 > n1 is dened by T2 = h(z1;n3). Now consider the
case z2 > z1, which implies T1  T2. Let T3 = h(z2;n1)  T1. If T3 = T1 the supremum
is (z2;n1;T1). If T3 < T1 the supremum is (z2;n3;T1), where n3 > n1 and T1 = h(z2;n3).
The proof for the inmum is similar, which completes the proof of (i).






and S  ~ S, which proves (ii). Finally, (iii)
follows from an application of theorem 2.3 in Vives (1999, p. 26) (where S = X in his
notation and statement).
Proof of Proposition 4
Let
V (n;T) = p
A

(nT)   nC(T)   K(k;n); (A:29)
the rst best expected surplus with the same eort for all agents and an equal division of
labor as in Proposition 1(i). We can re-write (33) as
(n;T) = V (n;T)  
sf2
2A2n2 1: (A:30)
Dierentiating with respect to n and T,
n = Vn +
(2   1)sf2
2A2n2 (A:31)
T = VT  
sff0
A2n2 1: (A:32)
The expression in (A.31) is positive and that in (A.32) negative at the rst best solution
(nf;Tf) because 1   < 4=3, f0 > 0, and Vn = VT = 0. Since (33) is strictly concave
on an open convex neighborhood of both solutions, Tb < Tf and nb > nf. From (13) and
(20),











32which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5
We re-write (33) as




















T < 0 at the EDP solution. Since
n = nUp





















n2  0 (A:38)
because  = p=n for an EDP.
Before proving Lemma 4, we recall some facts about strictly quasi-concave functions. Let
X  Rn be open and convex and f : X ! R twice continuously dierentiable. First,
f is strictly quasi-concave on X if for all x 2 X its Hessian (the matrix of second-order
partial derivatives) evaluated at x is negative denite on the tangent to the level set of f
through x. It follows that, in one dimension, f is strictly quasi-concave if f00 < 0 wherever
f0 = 0. If X  R then f is strictly quasi-concave i either it is increasing, decreasing, or
increasing for all x < x and decreasing for all x > x. Similar statements hold for strictly
quasi-convex functions.
33Proof of Lemma 4
We start with (41) in the text. If (37) holds then (41) has three zeros











where  < 0 on (0;nb1),  > 0 on (nb1;nb2), and  < 0 and diverges to  1 on (nb2;1).
Since  is continuous and [nb1;nb2] is compact, a global maximum with positive expected
prots exists on (nb1;nb2). Dierentiating (41),
n =
nh
2(A2n2 + s)2; (A:40)
whose sign is determined by
h = A6p2n3   4A2ksn2   2ks2 + A4n(3p2s   2kn3): (A:41)




A4n4 + 6A2n2s   3s2
2(A2n2 + s)3 : (A:42)











It follows that  is strictly quasi-convex on (0;nq) and strictly quasi-concave on (nq;1).
Since  is decreasing near n = 0, it cannot be increasing on (0;nq). Suppose it is decreasing.
In that case,  is negative at nq and nq < nb1. Since  is increasing at n = nb1, decreasing
at n = nb2, and strictly quasi-concave on (nq;1), it must increase from nq up to a unique
global maximum and then decrease thereafter. It follows that nq is a local minimum where
nn > 0, a contradiction. We conclude that  decreases to a local minimum on (0;nq),




















kn   (Ap   T)2
+ s[kn   T(2Ap   3T)]
A2n2 : (A:45)
If (A.45) is positive then (33) is strictly concave in n and T. A sucient condition is















(38) is sucient. The rest of the proof is supplied in the text.
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